How China sees the EU: An analysis of China’s economic ties to member states after the Lisbon Treaty and how this affects the EU as a single voice
I figured I may as well post this here since I’ve had questions about it! Very unrelated to my other posts, but enjoy reading!!
Abstract
The European Union works to establish foreign policy in the realms of both economic policy as well as human rights policy. Taking into consideration that the European Community (EC) first established relations with China in 1975, the ways that the EU has negotiated with China has developed greatly, but so has the way China responds to the EU. It is uncertain whether China appears to accept the European Union’s efforts to appear as a sui generis system or prefers handling policy depending on independent member state. It is important to identify the possible future of the EU-China relationship because it questions if the EU has the ability to hold a dominant role in foreign policy relations as one single voice. By examining the Lisbon Treaty changes to the EU’s foreign policy measures, the paper will identify the privacy of human rights dialogues between the EU and China and the inconclusive data regarding the universal EU position in the UN. The concluding findings are that although the EU has developed its foreign policy with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU must continue to work to resolve the gaps between the member states and the institutions on developing a single voice.
Introduction
It is commonly understood that the European Union is not a collective sovereign state, but rather a unique political entity made up of sovereign states working together for common goals. Since 1975, the European Community and China have had diplomatic relations, continuing through the official establishment of the European Union with the Treaty of Maastricht, and further with the reorganization of the EU foreign policy mechanism with the Treaty of Lisbon. As one of the most powerful economies in the world, China holds a significant place on the world stage as a political power and is often compared to its equally as powerful competitor, the United States. However, although the European Union is China’s leading trading partner. It is recognized as a complex sui generis system that can represent policy areas as a single actor but can also address policy as independent member states. In consideration of this complexity, it is unclear as to whether China sees the EU as a collective whole or a series of separate sovereign states.
Moreover, The European Union works to establish foreign policy in the realms of both economic policy as well as human rights policy, and it is uncertain as to whether the European Union asserts itself as a representative whole in both economic and human rights policy, or if China accepts the European Union’s efforts to appear as a sui generis system or prefers handling policy depending on independent member state. Francois Godemont, a China specialist with the European Council, stated in a DW article, “Beijing chooses its partners based on which ones serves its best interests” (Godemont, 2015), in other words, working with individual countries is easier due to the complexity of the EU decision-making institutions. This uncertainty of the EU’s political influence over China leads to the question as to whether China sees the European Union the same way the European Union views itself, or if China sees particular European sovereign states as global competitors.
The European Union has developed economic strength and its priority for human rights with each treaty that is introduced. Taking into consideration that the European Community (EC) first established relations with China in 1975, the ways that the EU has negotiated with China has developed greatly, but so has the way China responds to the EU. China often chooses to address member states to avoid human rights condemnations strategically through establishment of strong economic ties to specific member states as an attempt to dissuade the EU from possessing a collective stance on human rights resolutions in both Common Foreign Security Policy and on the intergovernmental stage of the United Nations. It is important to identify the possible future of the EU-China relationship because it questions if the EU has the ability to hold a dominant role in foreign policy relations as one single voice. The research question seeks to answer if China’s ability to negotiate at member state level with economy affect the EU’s ability to holding a dominant role in foreign policy relations with China in the direct regard of human rights. The hypothesis is that the European Union’s member states have difficulty coming to a unified EU position on China’s human rights depending on their economic ties with China.
This paper will be organized as follows: the first paragraph will review the literature on the history of the China-EU relations, the way China views the EU, EU Foreign Policy Instruments to China, how China perceives human rights, and present-day EU-China relations. In the second paragraph, we will specify how we intend to conduct this research in methodology, the following paragraph will present an analysis of the case studies, and will be followed by concluding remarks.
Literature Review
History of China-EU Relations
The history of the relationship between the EU and China has been a complex one, as relations were first established in 1975 before the continuous development from the European Community towards a closer European Union through establishing the single market and the development of the common foreign and security policy. Anthony Luzzatto Gardner and Stuart E. Eizenstat argue that “foreign policy has always been the weakest element of the EU’s integration project” (2010, 106). Chen Zimin argues that since China established relations with the EC in 1975 the Sino-Europe relations had been mainly dominated by bilateral relations between China and EU member states with common foreign and security policy, while economic relations gradually shifted towards the Community level (Chen 2012). Chen argues that “if there are problems arising in China and a member state, even if that country is an influential member in the EU, does not mean that the China-EU relations are running into problems; in turn, if a certain problem arises in the China-EU relations, that does not mean China has problems with all European countries” (Chen 2012).
According to Ming Wan, China’s human rights issues were not perceived as a diplomatic issue by European governments besides the French government until 1989 (Wan 2001, 66). This was partially caused by the absence of human rights in foreign policy until 1977 in a Joint Declaration on the Protection of Fundamental Freedoms in 1977, to which the European Community focused on countries seeking candidacy rather than China (Wan 2001, 67). The first trade agreement was also signed in 1978, but later replaced by a 1985 agreement on trade and economic cooperation and has not been updated since (Caira 2012, 282). The EU responded to China’s Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, condemning the Chinese government and introducing an arms embargo that has lasted until the present day (Wan 2001, 69).
By the early 1990s, member states took to introducing policy and improvement of relations with China, initially led by Germany and then France, which both had initially been vocal about China’s human rights violations (Wan 2001). In 1997, the EU stopped sponsoring “anti-China resolutions… due to the defection of France, Germany, Italy and Spain” (Wan 2001). During the British EU presidency, Britain attempted to convince EU members to adopt a common position on China (Wan 2001). Wan suggests that China’s “rapid economic development since the 1990s is a major factor explaining Western Europe’s shifting position”, as he believes economic factors are the cause of shifting positions among member states that benefit from strong relations with China (Wan 2001).
Catherine Gegout identifies that between 1990 and 2005, the EU has used the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) framework, while primarily using UN framework to condemn China’s human rights (Gegout 2010). Gegout identifies that in 1997, France acted “for economic advantage…according to their national interest” (Gegout 2010). The UK, which had primarily restrained from establishing relations with China through condemnation of human rights, switched attitudes towards China by 1999, where all EU states at the time adopted the same position to propose no resolutions against China and to establish dialogue with China (Gegout 2010). In 2001, the EU states opposed one another due to most favouring unilateral national policies over common policy (Gegout 2010). Gegout deduces that clashes of interests in 1997 had economic impacts on trade relations on national levels, where exports to China by Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and France were reduced from 1997-1998 (Gegout 2010).
How China Views the EU
China perceives the EU as a sui generis actor, understanding that it is not a super-state but also understanding its political integration (Chen Zimin 2012). According to Chang and Pieke, China’s approach to the EU “has always been a dual one, its focus alternating between Brussels and Member states” (2017). China mainly focuses upon prioritizing Germany, France, and the UK on Western European dialogue, referring to the three countries as the ‘troika’, and only sends ambassadors of the top rank of vice-minister to these three countries in addition to the EU level (Chang & Pieke 2017). China judges the EU on the inability for member states to maintain mutual agreements on condemnation of China’s human rights record, and therefore sees the EU as “weak as a global actor” (Chang & Pieke 2017). According to Balducci, the multi level governance of the EU has caused limits on the power Europe can hold over human rights in China, as it is possible to shape perceptions through shaping member states interests and policy preferences (Wai 2010, 134). From some scholarly perspectives, China “needs Europe’s market, investment and technologies, [but] the Chinese are also aware of Western Europe’s needs for China’s market and political influence” (Wan 2001, 77).
EU Foreign Policy Instruments to China
The European Union initially used the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to condemn China’s human rights records from 1946 until 2005 before it was replaced by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2006 (Gegout 2010, 75). Through UN framework, the EU condemned China’s Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and continued to be used by the EU, which has been an observer state since 1974, and member states to develop condemnations and resolutions.
In the present day, the European Union focuses on diplomatic and economic instruments in foreign policy with China. It primarily uses the Partnership Instrument (PI) to cooperate with China (EEAS 2016) by funding actions in China to cover bilateral policy priorities in a wide arrange of areas, including biodiversity, climate change, energy, environment safety, migration, and trade (EEAS 2016). Since 1996, there has been an introduction of the human rights dialogue is “viewed as a political deal and substitute for a human rights resolution on China” (Kinzelbach & Thelle 2011, 61). The political dialogues consist of five levels: (1) summit meetings; (2) high level strategic dialogue; (3) bi-annual ministerial meetings between the Chinese Foreign Minister and EU member state ambassadors as well as foreign affairs minister of the rotating EU presidency and the Chinese ambassador to the rotating EU presidency, annual meetings between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the EU’s counterparts during the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the EU’s “troika” foreign affairs ministers; (4) dialogues on special topics including security, defense, crisis management, African affairs, development issues and human rights, etc.; (5) regular expert-level dialogues regarding Asian affairs, nucler non-proliferation, the export of conventional weapons, cyber-security, etc (Li et al 2017, 41). These human rights dialogues are primarily driven by the European Parliament (EP), which is more vocal against human rights violations in China than other institutions. The EP seeks to urge the Council and Commission to formulate “a more coherent and consistent policy towards China, between increased trade and economic relations, and substantial progress in democracy, rule of law, and human rights (Wai 2012, 121).
How China Perceives Human Rights
In 1998, China’s President Jiang Zemin asserted that “China would never copy the political systems of Western countries” (Gegout 2010, 78). Ting Wai identifies the three factors that Chinese scholars identify that shape China’s contemporary attitude towards human rights. First, the history of western imperialism in China and its effect on national sovereignty; second, the focus on economic development to continue to develop China’s hard power; and third, stability to support national goals (Wai 2012). China chooses to assert national sovereignty over human rights as a principle (Wai 2012). While China focuses its bilateral relationship with Europe in other fields, human rights “is not seen as an important issue n the bilateral relationship with Europe” (Wan 2001, 77). China perceives the human rights dialogue as “a completely optional, non-binding form of friendly ‘cultural’ exchange” (Chang & Pieke 2017). China released its first EU policy paper ever issued by the Chinese government in 2003, which has allowed the EU-China relations to develop into a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (Caira 2012, 284). The Chinese government has highlighted since 2003 that to remain a “strategic partnership”, they expect “proper handling of the Taiwan issue, on unofficial and nongovernmental basis”, “lift the ban on arm sales to China”, and “not have any contact with the Tibetan government in exile” (Caira 2012, 286).
Present Day EU – China Relations
Dr. Axel Berkofsky argues that the EU-China relations have not shared many common interests outside business and trade relations, leaving the question as to why the EU-China relations labels itself as a “strategic partnership” (Berkofsky 2006). Even up to 2006, the EU is struggling to accommodate “25 different approaches towards policies towards China seeking to formulate and implement one coherent EU strategy towards China”, as there are many different interests and approaches among EU member states when dealing with China (Berkofsky 2006). Berkofsky argues that the primary concern of the EU is that because China is non-democratic that it may not be realistic for the EU to engage in any relations with China in an effective manner. In regard to human rights dialogue, the EU initiated human rights dialogue in 1996, but it is mostly the European Parliament that seeks to encourage the EU Commission and EU Council to pressure China to improve their record (Berkofsky 2006). He concludes that there are a lot of issues in China that must be addressed before the EU and China can establish a “strategic” relations.
One of the primary challenges in EU-China relations has been the European arms embargo, which has been regarded as “a thorn in Beijing’s side primarily for political-symbolic reasons” (Chang & Pieke 2017; Wai 2012). While there have been negotiations in the beginning of the 21st century among EU member states and EU-China attempts to negotiate a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2007, efforts to remove the arms embargo have failed (Chen 2012, 11). François Godement, the director of the Asia and China programme and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, released a policy brief in March 2017 concerning the way China perceives the rest of the world. He states that China’s participation in the “global order” is for the purpose of protecting its economic interests and maintaining stability. The relationship with the EU to China is important, and although China does not align with EU values, it is still a primary actor in the economic sphere due to globalization. Godement’s brief asserts that it is of primary importance for the European Union to “hold China to its word” and ensure that China is accountable for claiming respect for multilateralism, rule of law, free trade, opening-up of the economy and reciprocity (Godement, 2017).
Methodology
In an attempt to analyze the sui generis formation of the EU, that is often seen as a complex system to with multiple levels of governance and member states sovereignty, it is important to identify the economic relationship with China that is fundamentally rooted in national interests that deter certain member states from engaging in human rights condemnations.
In consideration of the literature review and the role of member states in EU foreign policy on condemnation of human rights in China, this paper will identify the changes made in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) regarding approaches to the EU’s foreign policy on human rights, and the changes made to the EU-China relationship as a direct result of the Treaty of Lisbon.
It is important to acknowledge there are indicators that have been difficult to find to identify the EU’s official position on human rights in China due to the absence of UN resolutions passed directly regarding China and insufficient information regarding the attempts to pass resolutions by the EU but blocked or rejected by a member state. It is also important to address that human rights dialogues are not transparent, as mentioned in Kinzelbach and Thelle, “public information on the dialogue process is scarce and all details are classified” (2011, 62). However, the indication of the presence of a human rights dialogue reflects the cooperation of member states with the EU as representation. There has been a sufficient amount of evidence that clearly labels and identifies general framing of Human Rights Dialogues that usually occur between the EU and China on a very regular basis, oftentimes once a year. Despite China appearing to consider the human rights dialogues as casual conversation more than an exertion of EU power, it is an important tool that establishes a basic level of contact with China in direct regard to sharing concerns of human rights. Therefore, the use of human rights dialogue annually from 2012 – 2016 shall be used as a primary indicator of good terms between the EU and China, as the human rights dialogue is not a condemnation of human rights but a direct symbol of China willingly acknowledging the EU as a single entity. The absence of a dialogue can be a disruption of the EU member states’ willingness to keep human rights talks at a less condemning level, which can also mean there is a change in the economic relations between China and certain individual member states.
Due to China’s active role in developing a strong economic relationship with the following countries, we will compare the member states of Germany, France, and the UK due to their close ties to China through economy by identifying imports and exports from a time frame of 2012-2016 to observe the possible trends regarding China and human rights in the EU. The time frame has been chosen because the only available data reaches 2016 and an absence of data for 2017, and China’s new president Xi Jinping was introduced to his position and to the rest of the world in 2012, meaning a new leadership could correlate to a new approach to bilateral relations between the EU and China.
Case Study
Lisbon Treaty Changes to EU Foreign Policy
The Lisbon Treaty entered into force across the (then) 27 member states of the European Union on December 1, 2009. In 2004, EU leaders wanted to create one overarching constitution that would replace the EU treaties, which was rejected by French and Dutch voters who didn’t approve of the threat to their sovereignty (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 105). The Lisbon Treaty introduced in 2007 was “nearly identical in substance to the constitution but… dropped references to the trappings of statehood” (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 105). The Lisbon Treaty represents the EU externally in all areas, except for the Common Foreign Securtiy Policy (CFSP), which is represented by the High Representative under Article 17(1) and 27(2) TEU (Gstöhl 2011, 185). The High Representative, who serves a five-year term as EU foreign minister and supported by a large corps of diplomats, also serves as vice president of the European Commission and carries out policies determined by member states (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 108). There are limits to the High Representative’s power, as not only are they only able to act with the unanimous consent of the member states, there are four other commissioners responsible for international trade, EU enlargement “neighborhood policy”, and international cooperation, humanitarian aid, crisis response, and development assistance (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 109). The creation of the European diplomatic service, the European External Action Service, which is under the HR’s direction, has been regarded as one of the “main innovations” of the Lisbon Treaty (Trombetta 2012, 60). The role of the European Parliament also received monumental changes, which was limited before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. It has adapted from a consultative body to becoming a co-legislator with the Council of the European Union with the ability to exercise decision-making power, veto power, and approval of treaty provisions before policy adoption (Li et al 2017, 49).
The primary challenges of the Lisbon Treaty lie with the “tense relationship between the foreign policies of the individual member states and that of the EU as a whole” (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 110). Due to rules of participation, only member states are capable of becoming full members of international institutions. The European Union has been granted observer status in the United Nations, where they are capable of the right to speak, can propose amendments, preside over meetings, serve as rapporteur, but cannot vote (Gstöhl 2011, 183). Therefore, foreign policy decision-making is still more intergovernmental than supranational (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 110). Ultimately, the EU is still criticized for being “overrepresented”, as despite claiming to be a “single, coherent actor”, there are high numbers of European officials present in attendance of world forums or international organizations such as the representatives from the country holding the rotating Council of EU presidency, the European Commission, European Central bank, and other leaders from different member states (Luzzatto Gardner and Eizenstat 2010, 112). Despite all the amendments by the Lisbon Treaty, there remains the challenge of coordinating EU policies and member states interests.
Changes in EU-China Relations since the Lisbon Treaty
Since the Lisbon Treaty, there has been evidently better integration of foreign policy instruments on human rights. In August 2010, the China-EU high-level strategic dialogue was introduced. High Representative Catherine Ashton submitted a report regarding the EU and the strategic partnership at the meeting of the European Council in December, ranking China as number 2 behind the USA and proposing the EU establish more concrete relations to China and the EU (Li et. al 2017, 39). The major change in EU-China relations among EU institutions after the Lisbon Treaty enables the European Parliament to present stronger stances towards China, as the EP had previously been vocal about China’s human rights record but did not have the ability to participate in the China-EU Summit or join the human rights dialogues as official representative. Compared to other EU institutions, the EP has expressed “more emphasis on differences in ideologies in its stance towards China and has repeatedly linked issues concerning Taiwan, Tibet, the arms embargo, human rights and etc.” (Li et al 2017, 49). The European Parliament passed a resolution in 2012 regarding the human rights issues in Tibet, requesting the Chinese Government “to grant genuine autonomy over the historical territory…” (European Parliament 2012). However, there has been an introduction to a China-Europe High-Level Political Parties Forum that connects political parties from the European Parliament to China since 2010, and have enabled in-depth dialogues between political parties with different ideologies and political views. In 2013, the introduction of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation to strengthen the EU-China relationship. The agenda identifies one of the goals to “deepen exchanges on human rights at the bilateral and international level on the basis of equality and mutual respect” and “strengthen the human rights dialogue with constructive discussions on jointly agreed key priority areas” (EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda, 4). Overall, the cooperation between the EU and China is stable, but the EU is unable to come to a unified position on human rights among all member states due to the economic stakes some have with China.
The EU-China Human Rights Dialogues and the EU-China International Trade in Goods
In September of 2012, the 31st EU-China Human Rights Dialogue began. This was followed by the 32nd dialogue in 2013, a 34th dialogue in 2015, but an absence of a human rights dialogue in 2016. The 35th Human Rights Dialogue resumed in 2017. The EP’s Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) Chair Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D, Italy) stated the “European Parliament expressed its strong concern about the lack of dialogue in 2016 in its resolution of 15 December 2016” (European Parliament 2017). Because the Human Rights Dialogue is regarded as a substitute for human rights resolutions, the absence of any cooperation entertains the idea that there may be EU member states attempting to press the EU to assert a resolution instead of establishing cooperation. This may be caused by a variety of factors, some that may directly involve member states formally addressing China’s most sensitive topics as mentioned before, such as Tibet, Taiwan, or the refusal to consider the arms embargo. As many of the EU member states have established some forms of economic interdependence on China, many EU governmental actors are more wary of discussing sensitive topics in a formal manner and may not address controversial topics unless they are benefitting less from the EU at some point in time.
In 2016, China had become the largest partner for the EU imports and second largest partner for EU exports. Germany has been the largest importer and largest exporter to China among all other EU member states. The first graph (graph a) highlights the trend of import/export trade between the EU and China, which shows that in 2012 there has been a steady incline of import/export trade. However, in 2015 there is a peak regarding imports but the largest gap of balance between imports and exports compared to other years. This evident shift in economy between the EU and China can be a reflection of the coincidence that there is a parallel to the absence of human rights dialogue the following year. It can be interpreted that the increased balance gap is a reflection on the effects of a change in 2015 that ultimately affects the presence of the 2016 dialogue with China.
The Sino-German Relationship
It has been regarded that outside of Europe, China is Germany’s largest trading partner. In turn, Germany is China’s primary trading partner in Europe. The second graph (graph b) identifies member state exports from 2012-2016. While there is an evident peak in 2014, there is a significant drop in 2015 before stabilizing in 2016. In the third graph (graph c), there is a less dramatic decrease in imports in 2015, but still an evident trend. Both drops in 2015 appear somewhat parallel to the significant change in graph a, determining that this significant change is a reflection of a change in the relationship between Germany and China, but ultimately identifying a trend that the absence of a Human Rights Dialogue in 2016 could be a result of changes in the economic relationship between Germany and China. Because Germany is China’s primary European trading partner, it is most likely that the change in the EU economy is affected by Germany’s individual economic power.
The UK-China Relationship
The UK’s trade with China is significantly less than that of Germany’s, where in 2017 the annual value of the UK-China trade is $84 billion, in contrast to Germany’s $211 billion (USD) (CNN Money 2018). The UK sends only 3% of its exports to China, while receiving 7% of imports. However, China is the second trading partner outside the EU behind the US (BBC 2016), and is the UK’s fifth largest trading partner. Therefore, it is a necessity for the UK to maintain a steady relationship with China for its own economic benefit. In 2015, the UK increased its export, compared to France and Germany who both dropped below their highest points in 2014 (graph b). In graph c, there was a very slight decrease in 2015 with UK imports compared to more significant decreases that are evident with France and Germany. It is possible to assume that the UK’s relationship with China did not ultimately affect the EU-China relationship, as the UK still benefitted from the mutual relationship at the time the Human Rights dialogue was suspended.
The Franco-Chinese Relationship
France and China share a long history of economic trade since 1964, where bilateral trade has now increased 500 times to $52 billion in 2014. In 2016, Franco-Chinese bilateral trade was worth 68.6 billion euros. France is the third European trading partner to China, while China is the first trading partner in Asia for France. Graph b identifies the trending decline beginning from 2014 to 2015, while graph c identifies a sharper decline in 2015 than in graph b. Upon taking into consideration the importance of China in France’s economy, it can be assumed that the decline in economic prosperity in 2015 could be related to the absence of the EU- China Human Rights Dialogue.
Primary Conclusions
It has been difficult to find indicators of EU human rights mechanisms. First, there are many journals that have been dedicated to the study of the EU position on human rights towards China through the use of UN statements and resolutions by the EU as an actor. However, there is little to no follow up of the collection of data from 2012 onward and insufficient evidence regarding the positions taken by the EU and other member states when it comes to negotiating on a common position to address the intergovernmental stage. In particular, there have been no UN resolutions condemning Chinese human rights, but the records of the EU attempting to establish statements or draft resolutions in the UN and being blocked by specific member states are absent in research. There is also a lot of evidence regarding the way member state government officials address the Tibet and Taiwan human rights issues, but unfortunately these factors have been too complicated to determine in a consistent and measurable form. The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue has been the only determinant of the human rights focus by the EU to China, but because of the lack of sufficient details, there are briefs that are accessible that do not address the research question.
Conclusion
The Lisbon Treaty has become a stronger mechanism to improve the correlation of EU member states to a unified stance on human rights in China. However, there is still a difficulty to maintain a consistent level of coordinating EU policies with state interests. Germany, the UK, and France are the primary member states that China chooses to cooperate with in consideration to their importance on the world stage as economic powers of the European Union. By identifying an absence of a human rights dialogue in 2016 and coordinating it with a significantly lower economic import/export relationship with China the year prior, there can be two assumptions drawn from this; (1) it can be presumed that a member state, or member states, could have challenged China’s human rights record and therefore took a hit to their economy while China also withdrew from Human Rights Dialogue with the EU, or (2) the decrease in the member state’s economy led to challenging China’s human rights record and therefore China withdrew from Human Rights Dialogue with the EU. Regardless of the causes, this is entirely speculation due to the general understanding of China’s history of human rights, China’s stance on human rights, and the general journals by scholars that have identified periods in time where member states acted on their own interests but mostly up to 2012, and an understanding of the changes of the Lisbon Treaty and its effects on the EU-China relationship, there is still a challenge to comprehend the specific details of each Human Rights Dialogue due to the privacy of the content of discussion as well as the inconclusiveness of the role of the EU in the UN and its struggles to coordinate with member states on a unified position.
Ultimately, the hypothesis is proven inconclusive, as although there is an evident coordination between the trend of a decline in the EU economy, especially in specific member states, and the absence of a Human Rights Dialogue with the EU in 2016, conclusions drawn from this can only be speculated and not proved with more tangible evidence. Overall, the European Union’s member states have, although affected by their national interests through their economic deals with China, remained unified in the ability to maintain a steady human rights dialogue after the Lisbon Treaty, but the shift in 2016 concerning the EU’s economy that affected some member states more and the suspension of the human rights dialogue has created a suspicion that there could have been a difficulty maintaining a unified EU position on human rights. However, due to the identification of the changes the Lisbon Treaty has brought to the European Union and its partnership with China, the economies of these three ‘troika’ are still going strong with mutual economic cooperation with China, and there is also evidence there are improved unified stances of the EU by member states that largely shift away from condemning China for human rights. This evidence is witnessed through the absence of evidence of an EU resolution directly addressing China’s human rights in the UN as well as a continued development of the EU’s persistence to maintain Human Rights Dialogue with China, even with the support of the most vocal EU institution, the EU Parliament, which is still the most vocal institution regarding China’s human rights record. Despite the EU’s difficulty to maintain a single voice in the complexity of its multilateral sui generis system, it is up to the EU to decide how to bridge the gaps not resolved by the Lisbon Treaty between the member states and the institutions for the future.
Works Cited
Berkofsky, Axel. "EU-China Relations – Really Towards a »Strategic Partnership«?" Sicherheit Und Frieden (S F) / Security and Peace 24, no. 4 (2006): 185-91.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24231626.
Brown, Kerry. “How China-UK relations have evolved”. BBC. 15 June, 2015.
CAIRA, MARA. "The EU-China Relationship: From Cooperation to Strategic Partnership." In The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, edited by Bindi Federiga and Angelescu Irina, 281-90. Brookings Institution Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt12618t.22.
Chang, Vincent K.L. and Frank N. Pieke. “Europe’s engagement with China: shifting Chinese views of the EU and the EU-China relationship.” Asia Europe Journal, 1-15. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10308-017-0499-9
Diplomat Government Francais. “France-China: a global strategic partnership”. 2016.
European Parliament Press Release. EU-China Human Rights Dialogue should be strengthened, says DROI Chair on the occasion of the 35th dialogue on 22 June 2017.
Gardner, Anthony Luzzatto, and Stuart E. Eizenstat. "New Treaty, New Influence? Europe's Chance to Punch Its Weight." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (2010): 104-19.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699854.
GEGOUT, CATHERINE. "A Pure CFSP Case: The Condemnation of China’s Human Rights Policy (1997–2005)." In European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions, and American Hegemony, 75-93. University of Toronto Press, 2010.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctt2tv3sh.9.
Godement, François. “Expanded Ambitions, Shrinking Achievements: How China sees the Global Order.” European Council on Foreign Relations. 2017.
Gouvernment Français. “Relations between France and China are at their peak”. 3 July 2015. Gov.UK. “New Phase in Golden Era for UK-China Relations”. 15 December 2017.
GSTÖHL, SIEGLINDE. "EU Diplomacy After Lisbon: More Effective Multilateralism?" The Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, no. 2 (2011): 181-91. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24590806.
HOLLAND, MARTIN, and NATALIA CHABAN. "Perceptions of EU Foreign Policy outside Europe." In The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, edited by Bindi Federiga, 319-36. Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpgwz.28.
12
Kinzelbach, Katrin, and Hatla Thelle. "Taking Human Rights to China: An Assessment of the EU's Approach [Corrected Title: Talking Human Rights to China: An Assessment of the EU's Approach." The China Quarterly, no. 205 (2011): 60-79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41305194.
Lampton, David M. "China's Foreign Policy." Great Decisions, 2014, 73-84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43681117.
Luo Xiaoming. “Chinese investment in the UK is an opportunity not a threat.” Evening Standard. 21 August 2017.
Petroff, Alanna. “China-UK trade is tiny. Theresa May needs that to change.” CNN Money. January 31, 2018.
Song, Xinning. "Challenges and Opportunities in EU-China Relations." In Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals?, edited by Vogt Roland, 19-36. Hong Kong University Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xw9fk.8.
Tharoor, Shashi. “China and Germany: So Far, Yet So Close.” The Diplomat. December 06. 2017.
TROMBETTA, RAFFAELE. "The Making of EU Foreign Policy—Does Lisbon Matter?: A View from Within." In The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World, edited by Bindi Federiga and Angelescu Irina, 51-61. Brookings Institution Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt12618t.7.
von Hein, Matthias. “Germany and China: A special relationship?” DW. April 07. 2014.
Wai, Ting. "Human Rights and EU-China Relations." In Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals?, edited by Vogt Roland, 115-38. Hong Kong University Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xw9fk.13.
Wan, Ming. "Human Rights and Sino-European Relations." In Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests, 66-84. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt4cgh2z.6.
Wei Shen. “France-China relations: from ‘special’ to ‘strategic’?” EU-Asia Centre. 28 January 2014.
ZHIMIN, CHEN. "Europe as a Global Player: A View from China." Perspectives 20, no. 2 (2012): 7-29. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23616128.
Graph A: Eurostat statistics. Imports, exports and trade balance between the EU and China 2007- 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics
explained/index.php/File:Imports,_exports_and_trade_balance_between_the_EU_and_China,_2 007-2016.png
13
Graphs B & C: data collected from World Integrated Trade Solution.
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/DEU/Year/2016/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Part ner/CHN/Product/all-groups
Graphs
14
15
